On July 10, Pfc Robert Hernandez of Company A, 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, was manning an M-60 machine gun position when it took a direct hit from NVA mortars. The official figure of 205 KIA only represents Marine deaths in the Operation Scotland TAORthat is, Marines killed in proximity to the Khe Sanh Combat Base during the period from November 1, 1967, to March 31, 1968. [93] At 18:10 hours, the PAVN followed up their morning mortar attack with an artillery strike from 152mm howitzers, firing 60 rounds into the camp. For them, the battle started when the North Vietnamese attacks began in January. The relief of Khe Sanh, called Operation Pegasus, began . The official assessment of the North Vietnamese Army dead is just over 1,600 killed, with two . Reinforcements from the ARVN 256th Regional Force (RF) company were dispatched aboard nine UH-1 helicopters of the 282nd Assault Helicopter Company, but they were landed near the abandoned French fort/former FOB-3 which was occupied by the PAVN who killed many of the RF troops and 4 Americans, including Lieutenant colonel Joseph Seymoe the deputy adviser for Quang Tri Province and forcing the remaining helicopters to abandon the mission. This range overmatch was used by the PAVN to avoid counter-battery fire. [163] Other theories argued that the forces around Khe Sanh were simply a localized defensive measure in the DMZ area or that they were serving as a reserve in case of an offensive American end run in the mode of the American invasion at Inchon during the Korean War. The Battle of Khe Sanh began Jan. 21, 1968, with inconclusive ground activity by US and North Vietnamese patrols. by John Prados. American commanders considered the defense of Khe Sanh a success, but shortly after the siege was lifted, the decision was made to dismantle the base rather than risk similar battles in the future. For example, I served with a Marine heavy mortar battery at Khe Sanh during the siege. Time magazine, in an April 12, 1968, article titled Victory at Khe Sanh, reported General William Westmoreland, commander of U.S. forces in Vietnam, after flying into Khe Sanh by helicopter, declaring: We took 220 killed at Khe Sanh and about 800 wounded and evacuated. Due to severe losses, however, the NVA abandoned its plan for a massive ground attack. [171] When Hanoi made the decision to move in around the base, Khe Sanh was held by only one or two American battalions. Aug 23, 2013. With Khe Sanh facing a full-scale. Hundreds of mortar rounds and 122-mm rockets slammed into the base, levelling most of the above-ground structures. 20,000-30,000 men Battle of Khe Sanh Overview The 26th Marines were activated in 1944 and fought in the Battle of Iwo Jima during World War II and were activated again on 1 March 1966, and fought in the Battle of Khe Sanh during the Vietnam War . Setting out from Ca Lu, 10 miles east of Khe Sanh, Pegasus opened the highway, linked up with the Marines at Khe Sanh, and engaged NVA in the surrounding area. [105] At 07:40, a relief force from Company A, 2nd Platoon set out from the main base and attacked through the PAVN, pushing them into supporting tank and artillery fire. [78], Thus began what was described by John Morocco as "the most concentrated application of aerial firepower in the history of warfare". The fact that the North Vietnamese committed only about half of their available forces to the offensive (6070,000), most of whom were Viet Cong, is cited in favor of Westmoreland's argument. The deaths of U.S. Air Force personnel, estimated between five and 20, are also omitted. On March 6, two U.S. Air Force C-123 cargo airplanes departed Da Nang Air Base en route to Khe Sanh. [66] Hours after the bombardment ceased, the base was still in danger. Early in the war US forces had established a garrison at Khe Sanh in Quang Tri province, in the . Seven miles west of Khe Sanh on Route 9, and about halfway to the Laotian border, sat the U.S. Army Special Forces camp at Lang Vei. Ray Stubbe has published a translation of the North Vietnamese history of the siege at Khe Sanh. This article was written by Peter Brush and originally published in the June 2007 issue of Vietnam Magazine. Casualties were heavy among the attacking PAVN, who lost over 200 killed, while the defending Marines lost two men. On 18 January, Westmoreland passed his request for Air Force control up the chain of command to CINCPAC in Honolulu. The main US forces defending Khe Sanh Combat Base (KSCB) were two regiments of the United States Marine Corps supported by elements from the United States Army and the United States Air Force (USAF), as well as a small number of Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) troops. The PAVN infantry, though bracketed by artillery fire, still managed to penetrate the perimeter of the defenses and were only driven back after severe close-quarters combat. None of the deaths associated with Scotland II are included in the official count. On 22 March, over 1,000 North Vietnamese rounds fell on the base, and once again, the ammunition dump was detonated. One of the first enemy shells set off an explosion in the main ammunition dump. Unlike the Marines killed in the same place in January, since Operation Scotland had ended, the four Lima Company Marines who died in this attack on Hill 881 North were excluded from the official statistics. Gordan L Rottman, Osprey Campaign 150: The Khe Sanh 1967-68, p. 51. [119] By 11:00, the battle was over, Company A had lost 24 dead and 27 wounded, while 150 PAVN bodies were found around the position, which was then abandoned. The NVA surrounded Khe Sanh in an attempt to force the Marines to break out of their fighting positions, which would make it easier to engage and destroy them. The PAVN would try to take Khe Sanh, but if could not, it would occupy the attention of as many American and South Vietnamese forces in I Corps as it could, which would facilitate the Tet Offensive. Historians have observed that the Battle of Khe Sanh may have distracted American and South Vietnamese attention from the buildup of Viet Cong (VC) forces in the south before the early 1968 Tet Offensive. January 30 marked the first day of the Vietnamese lunar new year celebration, called Tet. [87], Heated debate arose among Westmoreland, Commandant of the Marine Corps Leonard F. Chapman Jr., and Army Chief of Staff Harold K. Johnson. The report, originally classified as secret, noted that intelligence from many sources indicated conclusively that the North Vietnamese had planned a massive ground attack against the base. After a ten-day battle, the attackers were pushed back into Cambodia. If only it had contaminated the stream, the airlift would not have provided enough water to the Marines. [133] The Marines would be accompanied by their 11th Engineer Battalion, which would repair the road as the advance moved forward. [164] He cited the fact that it would have taken longer to dislodge the North Vietnamese at Hue if the PAVN had committed the three divisions at Khe Sanh to the battle there instead of dividing its forces. The Battle of la Drang was considered essential because it sets up a change of tactics for both troops during the conflict. For seven weeks, American aircraft dropped from 35,000 to 40,000 tons of bombs in nearly 4,000 airstrikes. [23][Note 2], James Marino wrote that in 1964, General William Westmoreland, the US commander in Vietnam, had determined, "Khe Sanh could serve as a patrol base blocking enemy infiltration from Laos; a base for operations to harass the enemy in Laos; an airstrip for reconnaissance to survey the Ho Chi Minh Trail; a western anchor for the defenses south of the DMZ; and an eventual jumping-off point for ground operations to cut the Ho Chi Minh Trail. According to this history, originally classified as secret, the battle deaths for all major NVA units participating in the entire Highway 9Khe Sanh Front from January 20 until July 20, 1968, totaled 2,469. In the coming days, a campaign headquarters was established around Sap Lit. On the morning of 22 January Lownds decided to evacuate the remaining forces in the village with most of the Americans evacuated by helicopter while two advisers led the surviving local forces overland to the combat base. [37] He was vociferously opposed by General Lewis W. Walt, the Marine commander of I Corps, who argued heatedly that the real target of the American effort should be the pacification and protection of the population, not chasing the PAVN/VC in the hinterlands. For some unknown reason, the PAVN troops did not press their advantage and eliminate the pocket, instead throwing a steady stream of grenades at the Marines. The Marines knew that their withdrawal from Khe Sanh would present a propaganda victory for Hanoi. Marines remained around Hill 689, though, and fighting in the vicinity continued until 11 July until they were finally withdrawn, bringing the battle to a close. [93], The situation changed radically during the early morning hours of 7 February. [24], The plateau camp was permanently manned by the US Marines in 1967, when they established an outpost next to the airstrip. [89] As a result, on 7 March, for the first time during the Vietnam War, air operations were placed under the control of a single manager. [112][113][114] In addition, over 100,000 tons of bombs were dropped until mid-April by aircraft of the USAF, US Navy and Marines onto the area surrounding Khe Sanh. During the darkness of January 20-21, the NVA launched a series of coordinated attacks against American positions. HistoryNet.com contains daily features, photo galleries and over 25,000 articles originally published in our nine magazines. A group of 12 A-4 Skyhawk fighter-bombers provided flak suppression for massed flights of 1216 helicopters, which would resupply the hills simultaneously. All of the attacks were conducted by regimental-size PAVN/VC units, but unlike most of the previous usual hit-and-run tactics, they were sustained and bloody affairs. Further information on the bombing campaign: Further information on the electronic sensor system: Westmoreland's plan to use nuclear weapons, President Johnson orders that the base be held at all costs, Operation Charlie: evacuation of the base. "[52], Brigadier General Lowell English (assistant commander 3rd Marine Division) complained that the defense of the isolated outpost was ludicrous: "When you're at Khe Sanh, you're not really anywhere. [172], On 30 January 1971, the ARVN and US forces launched Operation Dewey Canyon II, which involved the reopening of Route 9, securing the Khe Sanh area and reoccupying of KSCB as a forward supply base for Operation Lam Son 719. That appraisal was later altered when the PAVN was found to be moving major forces into the area. At dawn on 21 January, it was attacked by a roughly 300-strong PAVN battalion. A closer look at the Khe Sanh body count, however, reveals anything but a straightforward matter of numbers. They were not included in the official Khe Sanh counts. On April 6, a front-page story in The New York Times declared that the siege of Khe Sanh had been lifted. Since late in 1967, Khe Sanh had depended on airlift for its survival. Subscribe to receive our weekly newsletter with top stories from master historians. Two Marines died. They asked what had changed in six months so that American commanders were willing to abandon Khe Sanh in July. [166] This view was supported by a captured North Vietnamese study of the battle in 1974 that stated that the PAVN would have taken Khe Sanh if it could have done so, but there was a limit to the price that it would pay. The Marine garrison was also reinforced, and on November 1, 1967, Operation Scotland began. In 1966 the Marines built a base adjacent to the Army position, and organized their combat activities around named operations. [145], Author Peter Brush details that an "additional 413 Marines were killed during Scotland II through the end of June 1968". In his memoirs, he listed the reasons for a continued effort: Khe Sanh could serve as a patrol base for blocking enemy infiltration from Laos along Route 9; as a base for SOG operations to harass the enemy in Laos; as an airstrip for reconnaissance planes surveying the Ho Chi Minh Trail; as the western anchor for defenses south of the DMZ; and as an eventual jump-off point for ground operations to cut the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Dien Bien Phu would loom large for the rest of the war, especially during the Battle of Khe Sanh. A single company replaced an entire battalion. [25], In the winter of 1964, Khe Sanh became the location of a launch site for the highly-classified Military Assistance Command, Vietnam Studies and Observations Group. The ground troops had been specially equipped for the attack with satchel charges, tear gas, and flame throwers. [41], To prevent PAVN observation of the main base at the airfield and their possible use as firebases, the hills of the surrounding Khe Sanh Valley had to be continuously occupied and defended by separate Marine elements. [126], On 30 March, Bravo Company, 26th Marines, launched an attack toward the location of the ambush that had claimed so many of their comrades on 25 February. Lownds feared that PAVN infiltrators were mixed up in the crowd of more than 6,000, and lacked sufficient resources to sustain them. The enemy by my count suffered at least 15,000 dead in the area.. 1st Marine Aircraft Wing records claim that the unit delivered 4,661 tons of cargo into KSCB. Only nine US battalions were available from Hue/Phu Bai northward. On the following night, a massive wave of PAVN/VC attacks swept throughout South Vietnam, everywhere except Khe Sanh. [90], The Tet Offensive was launched prematurely in some areas on 30 January. [33] The PAVN fought for several days, took casualties, and fell back. On the first day of battle, a big Communist rocket scored a direct hit on the main Marine ammunition dump, destroying 1,500 tons of high explosives, 98 percent of available ammunition. [29], During the second half of 1967, the North Vietnamese instigated a series of actions in the border regions of South Vietnam. And it had accomplished its purpose magnificently. Throughout the campaign, US forces used the latest technology to locate PAVN forces for targeting. The plane, piloted by Lt. Col. Frederick J. Hampton, crashed in a huge fireball a few miles east of Khe Sanh, killing all aboard. [131], Planning for the overland relief of Khe Sanh had begun as early as 25 January 1968, when Westmoreland ordered General John J. Tolson, commander, First Cavalry Division, to prepare a contingency plan. The assault began on 10 May 1969 w ith the 101st Airborne Division and troops of the 9th M arine Regiment, the 5 th Cavalry Regiment, and the 3 rd ARVN Regiment. Westmoreland echoed this judgment in his memoirs, and, using exactly the same figures, concluded that the North Vietnamese had suffered a most damaging and one-sided defeat. [161], Whether the PAVN actually planned to capture Khe Sanh or the battle was an attempt to replicate the Vit Minh triumph against the French at the Battle of Dien Bien Phu has long been a point of contention. The origin of the combat base lay in the construction by US Army Special Forces of an airfield in August 1962 outside the village at an old French fort. Military History Institute of Vietnam, pp. He has published over 20 books including: How to Survive Anything, Anywhere. Those 10 deaths were also left out of the official statistics. The monumental Battle of Khe Sanh had begun, but the January 21 starting date is essentially arbitrary in terms of casualty reporting. [43] Lieutenant General Robert E. Cushman Jr. relieved Walt as commander of III MAF in June. "[97], Ladd and the commander of the SOG compound (whose men and camp had been incorporated into the defenses of KSCB) proposed that, if the Marines would provide the helicopters, the SOG reconnaissance men would go in themselves to pick up any survivors. It claimed, however, that only three American advisors were killed during the action. This caused problems for the Marine command, which possessed its own aviation squadrons that operated under their own close air support doctrine. Telfer, Rogers, and Fleming, pp. [132], On 2 March, Tolson laid out what became known as Operation Pegasus, the operational plan for what was to become the largest operation launched by III MAF thus far in the conflict. In the 43-day . [21][68], To eliminate any threat to their flank, the PAVN attacked Laotian Battalion BV-33, located at Ban Houei Sane, on Route 9 in Laos. [121] Casualties from the bombardment were 10 killed and 51 wounded. At 0330 hours, soldiers of the NVA 6th Battalion, 2nd Regiment, 325C Division, attacked the Marines on Hill 861. HistoryNet.com is brought to you by HistoryNet LLC, the worlds largest publisher of history magazines. Battle of Hamburger Hill The 29 th North Vietnam Army had entrenched themselves on Hamburger Hill in South Vietnam; a joint US-South Vietnamese force was ordered to remove them. [147] The official closure of the base came on 5 July after fighting, which had killed five more Marines. "[24] In November 1964, the Special Forces moved their camp to the Xom Cham Plateau, the future site of Khe Sanh Combat Base. Minor attacks continued before the base was officially closed on 5 July. Mobile combat operations continued against the North Vietnamese. The most controversial statistic in Vietnam was the number of killed in action (KIA) claimed by each side. [33] Troops of the US 1st Infantry Division were able to respond quickly. GitHub export from English Wikipedia. [59], Making matters worse for the defenders, any aircraft that braved the weather and attempted to land was subject to PAVN antiaircraft fire on its way in for a landing. The fighting around Khe Sanh began January 21, 1968, and concluded around April 8, 1968. If firepower determined the outcome of the fight, it was airlift that allowed the defenders to hold their positions. It was not sufficient to simply be an American military person killed in the fighting there during the winter and spring of 1967-68. The new anchor base was established at Ca Lu, a few miles down Route 9 to the east. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam Studies and Observations Group, microwave/tropospheric scatter technology, "The Battle of Khe Sanh 40th Anniversary: Casualties in May 1968", "The Battle of Khe Sanh 40th Anniversary: Casualties in June 1968", https://web.archive.org/web/20080215233328/http://www.historynet.com/wars_conflicts/vietnam_war/3029941.html?featured=y&c=y, https://www.historynet.com/recounting-the-casualties-at-the-deadly-battle-of-khe-sanh/, https://www.historynet.com/the-withdrawal-from-khe-sanh/?f, "Khe Sanh: 6,000 Marines Dug In for Battle", "The US's secret plan to nuke Vietnam, Laos", "Memorandum for the President, 19 February 1968", "Battlefields of Khe Sanh: Still One Casualty a Day", "The US Army Quartermaster Air Delivery Units and the Defense of Khe Sanh", "5 things you didn't know about Khe Sanh", "Operational Report Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 8th Battalion 4th Artillery, Period Ending 30 April 1971", "Narrative of Events of Company B, 2nd Battalion, 506th Infantry, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) During LAM SON 719", United States Army Center of Military History, Bibliography: The Tet Offensive and the Battle of Khe Sanh, https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Battle_of_Khe_Sanh&oldid=1142289112. [99] The relief effort was not launched until 15:00, and it was successful. He gave the order for US Marines to take up positions around Khe Sanh. The attack on Khe Sanh, however, proved to be a diversionary tactic for the larger Tet Offensive. On June 28, a Communist spokesman claimed the Americans had been forced to retreat and that Khe Sanh was the gravest tactical and strategic defeat for the U.S. in the war. Officer casualties of all branches were overwhelmingly white. The village of Khe Sanh was the seat of government of Hng Hoa district, an area of Bru Montagnard villages and coffee plantations about 7 miles (11km) from the Laotian frontier on Route 9, the northernmost transverse road in South Vietnam. Whether they produced battlefield images of the dead or daguerreotype portraits of common soldiers, []. According to the official Marine Corps history of the battle, total fatalities for Operation Scotland were 205 friendly KIA. The Marines recorded an actual body count of 1,602 NVA killed but estimated the total NVA dead at between 10,000 and 15,000. Khe Sanh had long been responsible for the defense of Lang Vei. 6,000 men North Vietnamese Vo Nguyen Giap Tran Quy Hai Approx. [83] Westmoreland later wrote, "Washington so feared that some word of it might reach the press that I was told to desist, ironically answering what those consequences could be: a political disaster. Marine Khe Sanh veteran Peter Brush is Vietnam Magazines book review editor. Known as the McNamara Line, it was initially codenamed "Project Nine". [125], By mid-March, Marine intelligence began to note an exodus of PAVN units from the Khe Sanh sector. By comparison, according to another Army general, a 10:1 ratio was considered average and 25:1 was considered very good. [142], Lownds and the 26th Marines departed Khe Sanh, leaving the defense of the base to the 1st Marine Regiment. Marine Corps aviators had flown 7,098 missions and released 17,015tons. [69] The Marine Direct Air Support Center (DASC), located at KSCB, was responsible for the coordination of air strikes with artillery fire. This is the battles end date from the North Vietnamese perspective. [96], The Marines at Khe Sanh had a plan in place for providing a ground relief force in just such a contingency, but Lownds, fearing a PAVN ambush, refused to implement it. A platoon from Company D, 1/26 Marines was sent from the base but was withdrawn in the face of the superior PAVN forces. Let me caution everyone not to be confused. At around 10:00, the fire ignited a large quantity of explosives, rocking the base with another series of detonations. To support the Marine base, a massive aerial bombardment campaign (Operation Niagara) was launched by the USAF. Operation Pegasus: ~20,000 (1st Air Cavalry and Marine units), U.S. losses:At Khe Sanh: 274 killed2,541 wounded (not including ARVN Ranger, RF/PF, Forward Operation Base 3 US Army and Royal Laotian Army losses)[15]Operation Scotland I and Operation Pegasus: 730 killed2,642 wounded,7 missing[15]Operation Scotland II (15 April 1968 July 1968):485 killed2,396 wounded[1]USAF:5 ~ 20 killed, wounded unknown[1]Operation Charlie for the final evacuation:At least 11 marines killed, wounded unknown[1] [102], The Lao troops were eventually flown back to their homeland, but not before the Laotian regional commander remarked that his army had to "consider the South Vietnamese as enemy because of their conduct. Click to View Online Archive The Battle of Khe Sanh was conducted northwestern Quaag Tri Province, South Vietnam, between January 21 and July 9, 1968 during the Vietnam War. These forces, including support troops, totaled 20,000 to 30,000. [56], At positions west of Hill 881 South and north of Co Roc Ridge (163340N 1063755E / 16.561N 106.632E / 16.561; 106.632), across the border in Laos, the PAVN established artillery, rocket, and mortar positions from which to launch attacks by fire on the base and to support its ground operations. [150] On 31 December 1968, the 3rd Reconnaissance Battalion was landed west of Khe Sanh to commence Operation Dawson River West, on 2 January 1969 the 9th Marines and 2nd ARVN Regiment were also deployed on the plateau supported by the newly established Fire Support Bases Geiger and Smith; the 3-week operation found no significant PAVN forces or supplies in the Khe Sanh area. [26] From there, reconnaissance teams were launched into Laos to explore and gather intelligence on the PAVN logistical system known as the Ho Chi Minh Trail, also known as "Truong Son Strategic Supply Route" to the North Vietnamese soldiers. [12] Further fighting followed, resulting in the loss of another 11 Marines and 89 PAVN soldiers, before the Marines finally withdrew from the area on 11 July. The attacks hindered the advancement of the McNamara Line, and as the fighting around Khe Sanh intensified, vital equipment including sensors and other hardware had to be diverted from elsewhere to meet the needs of the US garrison at Khe Sanh. [51] Other concerns raised included the assertion that the real danger to I Corps was from a direct threat to Qung Tr City and other urban areas, a defense would be pointless as a threat to infiltration since PAVN troops could easily bypass Khe Sanh, the base was too isolated, and the Marines "had neither the helicopter resources, the troops, nor the logistical bases for such operations." He believed that was proved by the PAVN's actions during Tet. Operation Scotland II continued until the end of the year, resulting in the deaths of 72 more Marines. The attack was to have been supported by armor and artillery. They too were left out of the official Khe Sanh casualty count. [30], In early October, the PAVN had intensified battalion-sized ground probes and sustained artillery fire against Con Thien, a hilltop stronghold in the center of the Marines' defensive line south of the DMZ, in northern Qung Tr Province. The aircrew then had to contend with antiaircraft fire on the way out. The Marines at Khe Sanh Combat Base broke out of their perimeter and began attacking the North Vietnamese in the surrounding area. The Marines, fearing an ambush, did not attempt a relief, and after heavy fighting the camp was overrun. The lossesindicating that the enemy suffered a major defeatwere estimated at 3,550 KIA inflicted by delivered fires (i.e., aerial and artillery bombardment) and 2,000 KIA from ground action, for a total of 5,550 estimated North Vietnamese killed in action as of March 31. [108] The most dramatic supply delivery system used at Khe Sanh was the Low Altitude Parachute Extraction System, in which palletized supplies were pulled out of the cargo bay of a low-flying transport aircraft by means of an attached parachute. American intelligence estimated that between 10,000 and 15,000 PAVN troops were killed during the operation, equating to up to 90% of the attacking 17,200-man PAVN force. The Laotians were overrun, and many fled to the Special Forces camp at Lang Vei. [34] US intelligence estimated between 1,200 and 1,600 PAVN troops were killed, and 362 members of the US 4th Infantry Division, the 173rd Airborne Brigade, and ARVN Airborne elements were killed in action, but three of the four battalions of the 4th Infantry and the entire 173rd were rendered combat-ineffective during the battle. Five more attacks against their sector were launched during March. The site linked to another microwave/tropo site in Hu manned by the 513th Signal Detachment. Following a rolling barrage fired by nine artillery batteries, the Marine attack advanced through two PAVN trenchlines, but the Marines failed to locate the remains of the men of the ambushed patrol. Hernandez was killed. At least 852 PAVN soldiers were killed during the action, as opposed to 50 American and South Vietnamese. [40] The 2nd and 3rd battalions of the 3rd Marine Regiment, under the command of Colonel John P. Lanigan, reinforced KSCB and were given the task of pushing the PAVN off of Hills 861, 881 North, and 881 South. Construction on the line was ultimately abandoned and resources were later diverted towards implementing a more mobile strategy. The last of the American casualties were finally lifted off Hill 861 on March 17. The North Vietnamese lost as many as 15,000 casualties during the siege of Khe Sanh. Home > Features > Battle of Khe Sanh > View All. Thirty-three ARVN troops were also killed and 187 were wounded. Westmoreland was replaced two months after the end of the battle, and his successor explained the retreat in different ways. The Soviet-built PT-76 amphibious tanks of the 203rd Armored Regiment churned over the defenses, backed up by an infantry assault by the 7th Battalion, 66th Regiment and the 4th Battalion of the 24th Regiment, both elements of the 304th Division. That action prematurely triggered a PAVN offensive aimed at taking Khe Sanh. Due to the nature of these activities, and the threat that they posed to KSCB, Westmoreland ordered Operation Niagara I, an intense intelligence collection effort on PAVN activities in the vicinity of the Khe Sanh Valley. NVA casualties were more than 200. [141] Because of the close proximity of the enemy and their high concentration, the massive B-52 bombings, tactical airstrikes, and vast use of artillery, PAVN casualties were estimated by MACV as being between 10,000 and 15,000 men. In the course of the fighting, Allied forces fired 151,000 artillery rounds, flew 2,096 tactical air sorties, and conducted 257 B-52 Stratofortress strikes. Murphy 2003, pp. [69] Due to the arrival of the 304th Division, KSCB was further reinforced by the 1st Battalion, 9th Marine Regiment on 22 January. ~45,000 in total[11]~6,000 Marines at the Combat Base of Khe Sanh[12] [129][130] Nevertheless, according to Tom Johnson, President Johnson was "determined that Khe Sanh [would not] be an 'American Dien Bien Phu'". Stubbe examined the command chronologies of the 1st and 2nd battalions, 26th Marines, plus the after-action reports of the 3rd Battalion, 26th Marines; 1st Battalion, 9th Marines; 1st Battalion, 13th Marines; and more than one dozen other units, all present at Khe Sanh under 26th Marine operational control. what is telephone access id bank of america,
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